Schedule of Events

In his book, Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court, Richard Fallon, Jr., seeks to address the pertinent questions regarding judicial authority in their decision making processes. He argues that the Court’s decisions maintain their authority and, therefore, a moral obligation for others to follow their decisions, based on their legitimacy which he thinks can be measured in three ways: sociologically, legally, and morally. With this basis in mind, he further posits a tool for Supreme Court Justices to use in their decision making, which he calls the Reflective Equilibrium Theory, that seeks to describe the best way to maintain this authority in their rulings. In this paper, I seek to show that Fallon’s argument and theory are both internally and externally inconsistent; but, with some modification, can be salvaged and properly applied by the judiciary – more specifically, by the Supreme Court. This paper will proceed by, first, examining the jurisprudential underpinnings that both Fallon and I employ as our foundation in assessing legal authority followed by an in-depth explanation of Fallon’s theory coupled with my objection and recommendations. Finally, then, I will offer a modified theory and explain the importance of its implementation in judicial decision making.

In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith details one of the most influential economic theories of our time by laying out the framework of a free market, capitalistic economy. In the philosophical work, Smith defends capitalism as the best economic system in that it allows for equal opportunity of upward mobility. Additionally, he asserts that the paramount interests of a society are that of increasing wealth and continual economic growth. He argues the most effective way to promote societal interests is through the promotion of individual interests, as individuals, being active participants within the system, are the best judges of the market. In this essay, I employ the theory of utilitarianism to critique Smith’s claims of the successes of capitalism. I argue that the free markets within a capitalist system create unequal opportunity of upward mobility, which, in contrast to Smith, harms rather than benefits the most vulnerable members of society. I assert that the main interest of society is that of utility, and the pursuit of individual interest directly inhibits the maximization of utility, thus harming rather than benefiting the most vulnerable members of society. In the second portion of the essay, I use the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States as a contemporary case study to further demonstrate the ways in which Adam Smith’s free-market capitalism fails to meet the claimed successes by Smith. 

THIS PAPER, written by an undergraduate student at California Lutheran University, by and for his Philosophy Capstone, seeks to expose a threat of truly monstrous proportion. Through the groundwork in the field of (non-ideal) epistemology, an ontologically accurate depiction of the homeless condition is drawn. The oppression that this concept tracks begins with a negative internalization vis-à-vis epistemic oppression. It is later revealed that this is how the ‘Ouroboros’ is largely unknown to the relatively privileged who do not experience similar patterns of shared challenges. The Ouroboros reveals itself to those it oppresses by means of standpoint epistemology. The subjugated knowledge of the marginalized homeless population is the key to revealing knowledge about the monster. The paper continues with a poetic analysis of homeless testimony. The monster is then depicted in an account of the social ontology for the condition of homelessness. Within this account it is argued that a social contract exists, not unlike the ones traditional contractarians offer. An inequity is found in the contract, where the Ouroboros ‘eats its own tail’. It is the same reason why the privileged are largely unaware of the existence of the Ouroboros. Opposing epistemic oppression, person-to-person etiquette between those of varying social positions, opposing negative political policies such as vagrancy laws, and enacting a sustainable economic system that would lift the homeless above the poverty line through a universal basic income is demonstrated.

In this paper I will be defending the liberal view of culpable ignorance as it relates to moral blameworthiness. I will primarily be defending the 1983 article Culpable Ignorance by Holly Smith. I will be arguing that there are some cases that subject S is not morally blameworthy for morally wrong action X, due to that fact that S was unknowing of information I at the time of his act. Had S known I at the time of his act, I would have successfully dissuaded S from doing X. And, because S had no access to I for various reasons, S had no reasonable or legitimate possibility of knowing better and is thus unable to be held morally culpable. Lastly I will conclude with addressing counter arguments that claim culpable ignorance does not excuse an agent from moral blameworthiness.

The feminist sex and pornography debate has been going on for years now. The anti-porn feminists have been questioning the morality and contending that pornography is harmful to women. They have called for legal limitations and bans on sexual activities related to pornography. At the same time, supporters of pornography have claimed that porn is a form of speech and expression that gives women freedom and power. This debate raises many questions: whether or not pornography is ethical or harmful? Are limitations on pornography justifiable? And should we be putting more institutional restrictions on women, or should we instead focus on changing our country’s sexist culture and fixing the harmful aspects of pornography? These are the questions that need to be explored when talking about a topic such as pornography. As technology becomes more advanced, pornography has been evolving for the better, and these questions have become more critical. It can be challenging to identify whether pornography is so harmful that it needs to be limited or if the limitation of pornography is even possible without creating more harm. This research presents Cathrine Mackinnion’s classic definition of pornography and her argument against pornography. I also explain my defintion of pornography and I examine some other critical feminist arguments for and against pornography. Finally, I argue that certain forms of pornography are harmful and need regulation, while others should be promoted to enhance women’s sexual freedoms.

This paper examines the ideas of two prominent contemporary political theorists, Robert Nozick and Phillip Pettit, and presents a modified version of their theories on political legitimacy. Nozick, a proponent of the libertarian school of thought, contrasts Pettit’s theory of republican justice, legitimacy, and theory of freedom as non-domination by offering an alternative account of freedom as non-interference. In this paper, I will present both Nozick’s and Pettit’s accounts of political legitimacy, freedom, and the State, provide critiques for each argument, and ultimately present a hybrid theory of political legitimacy. My modified theory presents freedom as non-interference, while supporting a minimal state that arises without the violation of an individual’s freedom and continues to protect those freedoms through a contestatory electorate.

We have witnessed many instances of the exclusion of women of color, and specifically Black women, throughout the history of the feminist movement. Historically, the movement has primarily been focused on fighting for the rights of White women, and the experiences and needs of women of color were disregarded. This history is well established and is often acknowledged, but what been left unacknowledged is the exploitation and exclusion of Black women in the conventional feminist movement, which has resulted in many Black women refusing to align with the movement. This paper aims to offer an analysis of the epistemological disenfranchisement of Black women throughout the conventional feminist movement, and how a movement that has marketed itself as being intersectional fails to actually practice intersectionality. Along with this analysis, this paper offers a discussion of why the calls for unity throughout the movement are often denied by Black women, and why a united feminist movement is neither possible nor is it necessary.